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THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF LUJAN’S PROJECT
GENE R. NICHOL∗
Coming, as I do, from just down the road in Chapel Hill, I feel I
should begin by congratulating my Duke colleagues on your basket-
ball season.  I should do that, I know.  Actually, I do feel that if Caro-
lina can’t finish first in the ACC—in the spirit of Triangle fellow-
ship—then I am glad Duke has.  But in my hometown they tell me
that I only feel that way because I haven’t been in North Carolina
very long.
And I am certainly honored to have been asked to give the key-
note address at this impressive forum.  You have brought in great
lawyers and academics and activists from around the country.  I see
that I have been allotted about three or four hours to speak.  I did do
a brief ill-fated political stint once—but I am not Fidel Castro.  This is
almost enough time for a Bill Clinton State of the Union Address.
Unless something goes very badly astray, I think I can promise that
we will be done “way early” as my daughter says.
I am also delighted to have an actual substantive topic to address.
I have been a law school dean now for almost all of the past dozen
years; and deans are not usually entrusted with substantive topics.
We are usually just brought in to introduce the people who have sub-
stantive thoughts to convey.  And in my second term at Colorado, I
discovered I was only brought in to introduce the people who would
introduce the people who had substantive thoughts to convey.1
So I am glad to have a real, substantive topic, even if it is stand-
ing, and even if it means talking about Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.2  If, after a few minutes, I start
asking you for money, don’t worry.  It’s just habit.
∗ Dean, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill School of Law
1. I didn’t realize at first that giving warm and mindless remarks—meant to stir the hearts
and avoid offending some group of wealthy alumni—was so large a part of a dean’s job. The
only thing I found more alarming than that was that after I’d been doing it for a while, my col-
leagues started saying, “You know, you’re really good at making warm and mindless remarks—
you’re a natural at it.”
2. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
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As I looked at the program this afternoon, I saw that I am
speaking about “Access to the Judicial System, Citizen Suits, and the
Structure of Standing.”  I have no doubt that somewhere, in the dark
recesses of time, I agreed to that description.  I probably even sug-
gested it.  But, close up, it sounds particularly dreadful.  So, today, I
think I’d put it a little differently.
We are here to discuss Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife3 and Laid-
law—and more broadly—the future of environmental citizen suits
and shared public actions.  Cases in which a plaintiff, in some fashion
or other, asserts the public’s interest rather than just his own—in an
attempt to challenge the actions of the government or a private party.
That future, of course, had seemed modestly secure—at least for
statutory grants of standing—until a few years ago, when Justice
Scalia talked his colleagues into following his lead in Lujan.  There,
without apparent embarrassment, the Justices concluded that “legisla-
tively pronounced” “public rights” cannot provide the basis for
standing in the federal courts unless they comport with the Justices’
views of discrete, concrete and tangible injury.
Put another way, Justice Scalia and his colleagues announced
that a bolstered, toughened, more manly, injury requirement would
be applied to limit both statutory and constitutional private attorney
general suits.  For the first time in modern Article III analysis, the
court ruled that even though a federal statute sought to bestow
standing on a broad category of plaintiffs, the attempted grant of ju-
risdiction violated the strictures of the case or controversy require-
ment.  A clear statutory expression of authority to “any person” fell
before the notoriously amorphous demand for a constitutional case.
Given that, and given the essential similarity between the En-
dangered Species Act claim invalidated in Lujan and reams of other
environmental and consumer-oriented claims, for eight years one of
the largest questions in public standing law has been, “what’s next?”
Laidlaw attempts to say with some conviction that the answer to the
“what’s next” question is: “not as much as you might think.”  And
many (me among them) are tempted to respond, “Thank God for
small favors—or even large ones.”
I want to suggest that Laidlaw is right in its essential answer—the
answer that we will not dramatically re-make public law in the United
States through the unlikely tool of the standing doctrine.  Laidlaw is
right on that front.  And that should not have come as a great surprise
3. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
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to us.  Even if we might have been surprised that the vote to reverse
our friends on the Fourth Circuit was 7-2.  It perhaps should not have
been a surprise, not just because of changes in Court personnel or
theories of Article III, though those might have played a role.
Laidlaw should not have been a surprise because Justice Scalia’s
project in Lujan—no matter how committed he may be to it, or how
persuasive he can be with his colleagues—Scalia’s project in Lujan is
essentially impossible.  Or it’s at least much closer to impossible than
folks have typically thought.  And if something is close to impossible,
it’s not very likely to happen.  Laidlaw announced, for now, and I
think for a good long time, that it will not happen.  Why it’s impossi-
ble is what I want to dwell on this afternoon.
But if I am going to talk about why Lujan’s project is impossible,
I owe it to you to try to describe what I think Lujan’s project is.  So I
will start with that.  It’s not a great secret. Justice Scalia laid it out
fairly clearly even before he became a Supreme Court Justice in a
now-famous 1983 Suffolk University Law Review article.4  There he
wrote that the standing doctrine should be invigorated to combat the
“overjudicialization of the processes of self-governance.”5  A tougher
“distinct and palpable” harm standard should be employed not only
to abolish generalized constitutional claims but also to dramatically
limit the power of Congress to grant standing.
A heightened injury rule would “restrict[] courts to their tradi-
tional undemocratic role of protecting individuals and minorities
against impositions of the majority, and exclude[] [courts] from the
even more undemocratic role of prescribing how the other two
branches should function in order to serve the interest of the majority
itself.”6  Statutory rights, Scalia wrote, do not necessarily “suffice to
mark out a subgroup of the body politic requiring judicial protec-
tion.”7  Claims based on the public interest—the shared interests that
we hold in common—are political disputes, not lawsuits.  Congress
has no power to change that, even if it has been rather blatantly doing
so for decades.
That sentiment, of course, began to look like law in Lujan.  The
rights asserted under the Endangered Species Act were described as
4. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983).
5. Id. at 881.
6. Id. at 894.
7. Id. at 865-96.
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an inappropriate basis for jurisdiction because they were “abstract,”8
“noninstrumental,”9 and “plainly undifferentiated and common to all
members of the public.”10  And even if the generalized grievance no-
tion had only been applied in constitutionally-based cases in the past,
“there is”, the Court wrote, “absolutely no basis for making the Arti-
cle III inquiry turn on the source of the asserted right.”11  For those
who were paying attention, that seemed to suggest that it made “ab-
solutely” no difference that Congress had passed a law giving plain-
tiffs standing to assert the “abstract and undifferentiated” rights in
question.
The Court’s vision of injury, not the Congress’s, marks the
boundaries of Article III.  Were the Justices to ignore the “distinct
and palpable harm” standard at the invitation of the Congress, they
would violate Article III as clearly as if they heard a fender bender in
which there is no diversity jurisdiction.  At least implicitly, Lujan also
suggested that what was good for the Endangered Species Act12 in this
case might be good for the Clean Air Act,13 the Clean Water Act,14 the
Surface Mining Act,15 the National Environmental Policy Act,16 the
Fair Housing Act,17 and the like, in others cases yet to come.  Distinct,
palpable, individuated injury is necessary for a federal lawsuit, re-
gardless of what the Congress might have had in mind.
So Lujan, in full flower, would strike at congressionally author-
ized standing and the claimed “overjudicialization” of the operation
of American government.  It would restrict the permissible range of
statutory standing to concrete, individualized injuries that “mark out
a subgroup of the body politic requiring judicial protection.”18  The
goal of that heightened standard would be to remove the federal
courts from the determination of citizen suits based on shared, com-
mon concerns, which are actually designed to serve the “interests of
the majority.”  Otherwise, as Justice Scalia eventually wrote in dissent
8. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 601.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 575.
11. Id. at 576.
12. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994).
13. Air Pollution Prevention and Control (Clean Air) Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1994).
14. Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994 & Supp.
IV 1998).
15. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1994).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1994).
18. See Scalia, supra note 4, at 895-96.
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in Laidlaw, we “place the immense power of suing to enforce the
public laws in private hands.”19
MOVING AWAY FROM THE PROJECT
Now, of course, Laidlaw was not the first post-Lujan case to sug-
gest that this unflinching injury regime, even in statutory cases, might
not be all that it was cracked up to be.  We can choose our own ex-
amples, I suppose.  But two years ago in Federal Election Commission
v. Akins,20 the Supreme Court extended standing to a plaintiff claim-
ing to be “aggrieved” under the federal election laws because of the
“failure to obtain relevant information” about a political action com-
mittee.21
This made the case sound a good bit like one of the Supreme
Court’s famous “no generalized grievance” cases on the constitutional
side—United States v. Richardson.22  Richardson held that a citizen’s
group could not sue to obtain information about the CIA’s budget—
though the Accounts Clause of the Constitution seemed to guarantee
it—because the plaintiffs’ interest in the information was “undifferen-
tiated”—the same as everyone else’s.23  Justice Scalia, perhaps pre-
dictably, saw Richardson and Akins as two peas in a single jurisdic-
tional pod.
But the Court said that Richardson was irrelevant in the Akins
case because there was a “statute [involved] which. . . does seek to
protect individuals. . . from the kind of harm they say they have suf-
fered. . . .”24  Lujan’s foundational point that there is “absolutely no
basis” for distinguishing between generalized constitutional and statu-
tory claims was rejected flatly.  Since Justice Breyer wrote the opinion
for the Court, it was rejected with some enthusiasm.  At least this part
of Akins ought to be welcome.  Because if, as the Court has been
saying now for decades, the standing doctrine is “built on the single
basic idea” of separation of powers, it surely is not “absolutely” ir-
relevant whether the Court is acting to validate an Act of Congress or
invalidate one.
But if Akins turned its gaze away from Lujan, Laidlaw sped up
the process.  Not only did the majority in Laidlaw refuse to export
19. See 528 U.S. at 215 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
20. 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
21. See id. at 17.
22. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
23. See id. at 177.
24. See Akins, 524 U.S. at 21.
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toughened injury standards to the mootness arena; it applied very
generous notions of injury—seeking to ease access—and remarkably
flexible concepts of redressability—in order to lower the thresholds of
Article III.
And, more important for my purposes, Justice Ginsburg read the
requirements for a case and controversy so as to validate, in her
words, the “legislature’s range of choice.”25  That “range” of congres-
sional discretion included a commitment to civil penalties in citizen
suits.  Rather than degrading or discarding the remedial decisions of
the Congress, the majority considered itself bound by them.  Laidlaw
stretched jurisdiction to defer to legislative power.  Lujan manipu-
lated jurisdiction to wage war against it.
But these descriptions of Akins and Laidlaw only suggest major-
ity opinions with shifting priorities.  Change in priority is likely the
most consistent theme in all of standing law.  Liberal courts give way
to conservative ones.  Interventionist courts become passive.  Judges
often bend jurisdictional principles to hear the cases they want to
hear, and contract them to rid themselves of disputes they disdain.  If
Laidlaw and Akins represent more than that, if they represent a rejec-
tion of Lujan’s effort to circumscribe statutory citizen suits by using
the judicially defined concept of injury, why would that be so?
ILLEGITIMACY
The first, and I suppose the best reason for rejecting Lujan, as I
and others have written, is that it is illegitimate. Lujan, it should be
recalled, despite all the talk of judicial restraint, essentially invali-
dated an Act of Congress because it conflicted with the requirement
of “distinct and palpable injury.”  But the personal harm standard ap-
pears nowhere in the text of the Constitution.  Article III refers to
“cases” and “controversies.”  And for over 30 years scholars have
beaten home the point that injury was not a requisite for judicial
authority—for the existence of a ‘case’— in either the colonial, fram-
ing, or early constitutional periods.
Louis Jaffe, Raoul Berger, Justice John Harlan, and more re-
cently, Steve Winter, Evan Caminker and Cass Sunstein have demon-
strated that “early English and American practices give no support to
the view” that Article III demands injury.26  I realize that Professor
25. See 528 U.S. at 187.
26. See, e.g., LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION, 462-467 (1965); Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional
Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816, 837-840 (1969); Evan Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui
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Clanton may have begun to weigh in a bit on the other side.27  But it
remains clear that the injury rule in Lujan, used to invalidate an Act
of Congress, is supported neither by the text of the Constitution nor
ascertainable in documented historical patterns and practice.  It is
past ironic, therefore, that Justice Scalia has written so forcefully on
so many different occasions, that “a rule of law that binds neither by
text nor by any particular, identifiable tradition is no rule at all.”28  I
assume that sentiment should be said to apply even to Scalia-created
standards.
But I have said Lujan’s work is impossible.  And a constitutional
rule does not become impossible merely because it is illegitimate.
The Supreme Court’s path breaking free exercise rule, announced in
Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith,29 may be illegitimate—
given the history and intentions of the religion clauses.  I am not sure.
But it’s clearly not an impossible rule to maintain.  Quite the con-
trary.  It is perfectly stable and predictable: except for discrimination
claims, simply read the free exercise clause out of the Constitution.
Judges could apply it with complete accuracy in their sleep.
But Lujan’s constitutional injury rule has problems well beyond
its pedigree.  If taken seriously, it would require the wholesale revi-
sion of vital and well-established areas of jurisdictional law.  It also
seeks to employ an infinitely malleable, largely circular, value-laden
concept as a firewall against assertions of legislative power.  That ef-
fort eventually leads the Court to appear inconsistent, hypocritical,
and, on occasion, silly.  Lujan sets forth a path, therefore, that most
members of the Court are apparently unwilling to tread.
To explain.
First, the Court’s toughened injury requirement is powerfully out
of step with Article III’s other settled standards—mootness and ripe-
ness.  Since the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court has clearly constitu-
tionalized the injury, causation and redressability triad of the standing
doctrine.  The Court has also said, with clarity, that the mootness and
ripeness standards stem from Article III.
Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 345 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan?  Of
Citizen Suits, ‘Injuries’, and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 177 (1992); Steven L. Winter, The
Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988).
27. See Bradley S. Clanton, Standing and the English Prerogative Writs: The Original Un-
derstanding, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1001 (1997).
28. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989).
29. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
I - THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF LUJAN’S PROJECT - NICHOL.DOC 04/25/01  9:41 AM
200 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 11:193
But these jurisdictional cousins are more, the Laidlaw majority
noted, than “standing set in a time frame.”30  They arise from different
worlds.  They serve markedly different goals.  Ripeness openly bal-
ances issues of caution with the need for review.  It is hopelessly
bound to the subject matter in dispute rather than any overarching,
transcendent concept of harm.  Ripeness varies, quite intentionally,
with the nature of the claim on the merits.  Remind yourself, to dem-
onstrate the point, how much more difficult it is to present a ripe
takings claim than a ripe free speech challenge.
And the mootness doctrine is defined most accurately by its
myriad exceptions: the “voluntary cessation” exemption, the “capable
of repetition” exemption, the “collateral consequences” rule, and the
Court’s frequently generous treatment of class actions.  In mootness,
even the Chief Justice would completely suspend the requirement in
cases that have been rendered stale after being accepted for review by
the Supreme Court.  Mootness looks for loopholes and stretches to fit
disputes within them.  The doctrine is more interested in keeping you
in than fencing you out.
In short, the mootness and ripeness standards operate from
rather wholeheartedly different perspectives than the standing doc-
trine.  The presumptions slide in the opposite directions.  The rules,
such as they are, are based on practical imperative.  The barriers call
for specific factual applications rather than overarching guideposts.
Obviously, if the persistence of distinct and palpable harm is all that
really matters something has to give.
One of the most appealing aspects of the Laidlaw decision is that
it looked these distinctions squarely in the eye and said, “no, some-
thing doesn’t have to give.”  The Fourth Circuit was wrong to “con-
flate[]” standing and mootness—exporting the rigors of the individual
injury determination to a purportedly mooted claim.31  All of jurisdic-
tional law need not shift to accommodate Lujan—particularly areas
like mootness and ripeness that work far better, and make far better
sense, than the standing doctrine does.
PUBLIC LAW
Second, a bolstered injury requirement is at odds with the nature
of public law.  This, of course, is very old news.  As Abe Chayes
taught over two decades ago, while the traditional private rights liti-
30. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 189-90.
31. See id. at 174.
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gation model was bi-polar, retrospective, party-controlled and self-
contained; public law litigation takes on a different cast.  It typically
vindicates constitutional or statutory interests rather than common
law claims.  The relief sought might affect many people and diverse
concerns.  The argument is often about whether and how a govern-
ment policy should be carried out.  The decree is usually designed to
alter future behavior rather than to pay for past wrongs.  The liability
determination and remedial ruling are, to some extent, predictions of
what is likely to happen in the future.
These realities, of course, put the bolstered injury regime into
context.  Individualized harm, stringent rules of causation and, most
particularly, the demand for near-certain redressability seek to strike
clearly at the reach of public law.  But nothing in the Constitution
prohibits a public litigation model, and maybe more relevant, the
public law horse is clearly a long way out of the jurisdictional barn.
Flast v.Cohen,32 Reynolds v. Sims,33 Shaw v.Reno,34 Trafficante v. Met-
ropolitan Life Insurance Co.,35 Akins,36 TVA v. Hill,37 Northeastern
Florida Chapter of the Associated General Contractors v. City of Jack-
sonville,38 are an array of such overbreadth cases.  The more seriously
Lujan is taken, the more radical the purge of modern jurisdictional
law that it requires.  Except for a couple of members of the Court, the
Justices don’t seem to have the stomach for it.
INJURY
But the biggest reason Lujan can’t work has to do with the injury
standard itself.  It’s not enough simply to inquire whether a plaintiff is
injured in fact—concretely, tangibly, in a particularized fashion.  We
give credence to a plaintiff’s concern for the snail darter, his interest
in separationism, his worry over the indignity of being forced into ir-
regularly shaped congressional districts, his apprehension that he
might drive by a public park displaying a Christmas creche, and his
desire for the generalized benefits of interracial association.  We not
only conclude that these are, somehow, concrete rights but we also
32. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
33. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
34. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
35. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
36. 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
37. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
38. 508 U.S. 656 (1993).
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necessarily decide, that they are, in each instance, interests that are
judicially congizable—that is, worthy of judicial protection.
The Justices would not, I assume, reach the same conclusion
about a proffered desire to assure segregation or to remain in the
country undetected as an illegal alien.  Surely much of the basis for
the denial of jurisdiction in cases like Rizzo v. Goode,39 O’Shea v.
Littleton,40 and City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,41 was the Court’s belief
that the plaintiffs would be injured in the future only if they, again,
ran afoul of law.  A likelihood the Justices were not anxious to em-
brace.  It is not possible to ask, “is there injury?” without asking, as
well “injury to what?”
Of course this is a lesson every parent knows.  I came back from
a trip to Dallas a couple of weeks ago and brought my middle daugh-
ter a model horse that she’d been wanting for months and couldn’t
find in Chapel Hill.  (The horse selection is apparently richer in
Texas, like everything else. Or it’s at least tackier, like everything
else.)  Given the difficulties of the travel schedule, I ended up not
finding what my other two daughters wanted, so, by their lights, I
came home empty handed.  They, of course, explained with great fer-
vor, that what I had done was “not fair”—their favorite words, having
somehow been born with an innate sense of the 14th amendment.  I
had “hurt” them, they insisted.  I responded, of course, that buying
their sister something did them no harm—I simply failed to confer
upon them the same benefit.  Their asserted injury was one I was
adamant not to recognize.
The fact that I lost this discussion with my daughters—and lost it
badly—doesn’t change the reality that injury is not a self-defining,
factual construct.  Justice Scalia’s seeming belief that it is, is no more
correct than was Justice Douglas’s futile hope in Association of Data
Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp42 that all standing is-
sues would be made easy by the new reference marker “injury in
fact.”  Injury is a malleable, value-laden concept.  It is also impossible
to segregate from the necessary inquiry exploring which of an inex-
haustible array of interests is worthy of judicial protection.
Well, you may say, “so what?”  “No legal rule is perfect and
completely free from manipulation.”  It asks too much of a court to
demand otherwise.
39. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
40. 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
41. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
42. 397 U.S. 150 (1970)
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Well said.  But a circular, value-ridden rule is particularly prob-
lematic to employ as a wedge against congressional grants of stand-
ing.  First, it places the Supreme Court in the immensely undesirable
position of saying that the Congress may believe a particular interest
to be a public value—an appropriate basis for standing—but we dis-
agree.  Capping a public value—to use Joseph Vining’s exquisite
term—sounds dramatically like a legislative function, or, at the very
least, a job for which the Congress is far better suited than the court.43
Second, the injury barrier simply doesn’t work well in the face of
undeniable, and essentially unalterable, congressional power.  Con-
gress creates legal interests.  It does so every day it’s in session, and
probably even when it’s not.  Creating legal interests is, in fact, what
the Congress does for a living.  And when those legally created inter-
ests, having been brought into existence, are allegedly transgressed,
federal courts are immensely hard-pressed to deny that the injury
standard is met.
Now I say, hard-pressed.  That doesn’t mean it’s impossible, of
course.  Lujan itself made the attempt—though Justice Scalia’s opin-
ion presents a remarkable slalom.  He argues that prior statutory
standing cases, in which the plaintiffs asserted rights that would not
have provided the basis for standing without the statute—cases like
Trafficante and Havens Realty Co. v. Coleman44—those cases merely
recognized “de facto” injuries that were not previously judicially cog-
nizable.  Accordingly, their acceptance as a basis for jurisdiction did
no violence to the injury standard.
Of course the assumption here is that there exists a universe of
“de facto” injuries that constitutes the outer boundary of federal ju-
risdiction.  So long as Congress chooses from among the pool, Article
III is not transgressed.  But it’s hard to outline—without more—what
this glossary of “de facto” injuries might be.  Justice Scalia, I am sure,
knows it when he sees it.  But that doesn’t mean anyone else does.
Trafficante’s recognized interest in the “benefits of interracial as-
sociation” apparently constituted “de facto” injury, but not “injury in
fact.”  It is, of course, interesting to speculate on the differences be-
tween “de facto” injury and “injury in fact”—beyond the reality that
one phrase is in English and the other isn’t.  But I am not sure it gets
us very far in understanding what is supposed to be a straightforward,
threshold jurisdictional requirement in the federal courts.  The dis-
43. See generally JOSEPH VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY (1978).
44. 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
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tinction is clearly not something on which one would want to build a
constitution.
In a similar vein, Justice Scalia has explained that the reappor-
tionment cases are not “generalized grievances” because “one voter
suffers the deprivation of his franchise, and another hers.”  While the
right to the receipt of information he rejects as beyond injury in
Richardson and Akins is “undifferentiated”—apparently incapable of
being described as “one reader’s right to information, and another
hers.”  This has led the Justices further to debate whether “general-
ized grievances” are simply “widely shared” or must be “both abstract
and widely shared.”  Imagine Justice Scalia’s reaction if any other
member of the Court sought to produce and describe such a set of
distinctions.  The fur would fly.  Talk about injury on the head of a
pin.
Of course, even if one gets past this dizzying discussion of harm,
the Congress has other arrows in its quiver to confound the injury
barrier.  Legislators may explicitly define concepts of injury, causa-
tion and redressability.  Akins suggests that “rights” to informational
compliance can be added. If they are violated, of course, standing ex-
ists.  The qui tam tradition would seem to indicate that the addition of
a bounty to citizen-suit provisions would bring public actions rather
squarely within the core of the injury standard.  All of this demon-
strates the likelihood that an insistent Congress could turn the
vaunted injury standard into no more than a sophisticated drafting
requirement.
Finally, two decades of injury jurisprudence has proven beyond
doubt that an aggressive harm standard repeatedly takes the standing
inquiry into arenas in which it simply has no business.  If Laidlaw it-
self had gone the other way, the Court of Appeals was prepared to
order, in effect, quite complex mini-trials to determine actual harm to
downstream water users.  Trials which are apt to be largely unrelated
to the claim on the merits—that is, whether Laidlaw was violating its
discharge permits under the Clean Water Act.  Even if there is some
correlation in Laidlaw between the case on the merits and the re-
quired injury trial, in reams of other standing cases—Warth v.Seldin,45
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.,46 Allen
v. Wright, and Lujan itself—there is no relationship between the two
inquiries whatsoever.
45. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
46. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
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The dissenters in Laidlaw also showed no compunction about in-
terfering with the congressional embrace of civil penalties as an alter-
native to injunctions.  Though surely Article III is not meant to pose
such a barrier to Congress’ remedial choices in regulating interstate
commerce.
The opinion in Lujan went on at great length about the dangers
to executive prerogative and core Article II interests if jurisdiction
were upheld.  But it’s hard to believe that all those dangers would
have somehow disappeared if the plaintiff had purchased a plane
ticket and was actually prepared to fly to Egypt to enjoy the company
of the Nile crocodile.
Akins revealed, unsurprisingly, that tough implementation of the
redressability standard could block the reviewability of much agency
action, since we often don’t know, as a final matter, how agency dis-
cretion will be exercised if the case is remanded.  If agency discretion
is ultimately employed against the preferences of the plaintiffs, can
we say that the injury has been redressed?
The redressability standard has also raised interesting questions
in equal protection cases, where the remedy may be to send the leg-
islature back to the drawing board.  After all, if lawmakers are barred
from treating men and women differently in determining the drinking
age, they may still choose to deny 18-year-old males the right to buy a
beer.  But surely it is nonsensical to take the Article III hurdle that
far.  And the Court has vacillated wildly in asking whether injury is
satisfied by the denial of opportunity—as in cases like Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke,47 Heckler v. Matthews48, and North-
eastern Contractors—or whether the constitution demands the deliv-
ery of the actual goods—as in cases like Warth v. Seldin and Allen v.
Wright.  Again, this allows the Article III tail to wag the equal protec-
tion dog.
All of these concerns suggest to me that the Court in Lujan bit
off more than it can comfortably afford to chew.  Laidlaw and Akins
likely reveal that Lujan will never live up to its author’s aspirations.
That doesn’t mean, exactly, that it is a lark.  Standing cases are fre-
quently intuitive.  The Lujan dispute not only involved the procedural
applications of the Endangered Species Act (ESA)—a statute that, as
the repository of spotted owl and snail darter lore, many Americans
already regard as extreme—but turned on the implementation of the
47. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
48. 465 U.S. 728 (1984).
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ESA to projects in Africa and Sri Lanka.  If ever a case was designed
to bring on a judicial drop kick—Lujan was it.
That doesn’t mean, though, that Lujan will actually have life in
the garden-variety statutory public actions to which its language and
its theories could so easily be applied.  Laidlaw and Akins teach, I
think, that Lujan will not manage to gut, or to significantly restrict,
statutory standing in citizen suits.  That is not apt to happen next
year, or in 10 years or 20 years to come.  That may be bad news for
Lujan, but it’s good news for American public law.
